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Interpretation Of McGuire Act In Regard To Sales From
Free Trade To Fair Trade Jurisdiction
General Electric Co. v. Masters Mail Order Co.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held in Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Masters
Mail Order Co.' that a mail-order house located in the District of Columbia, a non-fair trade jurisdiction, could not
be enjoined from advertising in Maryland that fair-traded
articles could be bought in Washington, D.C., at prices below the minimum retail prices in effect in Maryland. That
decision was based exclusively upon an interpretation of
the Maryland Fair Trade Act,3 which was construed to
extend only to advertising made in connection with sales
to be consummated within the State. Since the sales took
place in the District of Columbia, the Maryland statute had
no application.' This decision left open the question
whether, under the McGuire Act,5 any state had the power
to apply its fair trade laws to sales into the state from a
free trade jurisdiction. The Bissell case, supra, was noted
in the MARYLAD LAw PRviEw which pointed out that the
court in that case confined its attention to the Maryland
statute and that "[a] more binding interpretation of the
extent of (the McGuire Act) is still wanting."
Such an interpretation has been proffered by the instant
case. Here plaintiff manufacturer sought to enjoin the de-

1244 F. 2d 681 (2nd Cir., 1957), cert. den., Tr. Req. Rep. 67,100, Dkt. 224,
Oct. 14, 1957.
2 240 F. 2d 684 (4th Cir., 1957).
4 Md. Code (1951), Art. 83, 15 102-110.
'Supra, n. 2, 687-8.
a66 Stat. 632 (1952), 15 U. S. C. A., Sec. 45(a) (1)-(5) (1956).
6 17 Md. L. Rev. 148, 152 (1957). Parenthetical material supplied.
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fendant (the same defendant as in the Bissell case), a District of Columbia mail order discount house, from advertising, offering for sale, or selling plaintiff's products in
New York below the duly-established New York fair trade
prices. Defendant sent goods to New York customers in
response to orders it received by mail in the District of
Columbia. Order blanks had been distributed to prospective customers by mail and also over the counter in New
York by defendant's parent corporation, a discount house
located in New York. The District Court granted the injunction.7 Because of the close supervision by the New
York parent, the sales were considered as having taken
place in New York. The decree was reversed, (2-1), on
appeal. The Court considered the defendant and its parent
to be distinct corporate entities and based its decision on
an interpretation of the McGuire Act.' This statute permits
the states to enact legislation validating resale price maintenance contracts, but only in those transactions in which
the resale (or sale) occurs in the state attempting to apply
its statute. The resales here occurred in the District of
Columbia, a non-fair trade jurisdiction, and therefore the
McGuire Act made the New York Fair Trade Act inapplicable to these transactions. Judge Clark held that the place
of resale within the meaning of the statute was the place
where title to the goods passed. Buyer and seller intended
to take advantage of the non-fair trade prices in the District of Columbia, and since the intent of the parties governs
the passage of title, the District of Columbia was the place
of resale. Judge Waterman concurred in the result but on
the ground that the place of resale was the situs of the retailer. Judge Lumbard dissented for the reasons offered
by the District Court below.
Judge Waterman and Judge Lumbard indicated concern
that the use of the concept of title in determining the place
of resale might open the way to widespread evasion of fair
trade law restrictions.9 Both judges foresaw the possibility
that parties located in the same or different fair trade jurisdictions could make specific provision for title to pass in
a non-fair trade jurisdiction which had a direct and substantial relation to the transaction. However, circumvention of the statutes probably is not this easy. Contracting
parties are not given that much latitude in stipulating
where title is to pass. It is generally held in this country
7145 F. Supp. 57 (S. D. N. Y. 1956).
8 Supra, n. 5.
SSupra, n. 1, conc. op. 688, 690, for Judge Waterman's observation; and
dis. op. 691, footnote 2 in Judge Lumbard's dissent.
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that stipulation by the parties that a contract shall be governed by the law of a jurisdiction which is neither the
place of making nor the place of performance of the contract is valid only if that jurisdiction has a real and natural
connection to the transaction.10 It seems evident, therefore,
that the parties could go no further than to agree that title
is to pass in the jurisdiction where either the vendor or the
vendee is located. It is difficult to imagine any other situs
which would have the necessary natural relation to the
transaction.
A more pointed criticism of the title concept may be
that the legislative history of the McGuire Act seems to indicate Congressional intent that the location of the vendor
should determine the place of resale. Sunbeam Corp. v.
Wentling,' held that the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act did
not apply to sales made from Pennsylvania into other states.
A year later Congress passed the McGuire Act,1 2 the apparent purpose of Section 4 of the Act being to overrule the
Wentling decision.13 It seems obvious that Congress intended that a seller in a fair-trade jurisdiction be subject
to the fair trade prices in that jurisdiction, even when he
sells to out-of-state consumers. Thus the District Court in
Maryland in Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 4 enjoined a
Maryland vendor from selling to an out-of-state buyer at
less than the established fair trade price in Maryland, holding that the McGuire Act enabled the Maryland statute to
reach this sale.15 It becomes apparent that if the title concept is applied, then the result reached in Sunbeam Corp.
v. MacMillan can easily be avoided by having the parties
stipulate that title is to pass where the buyer is located.
Stated another way, reading the title concept into the
McGuire Act in effect frustrates the purpose for which
Section 4 of the McGuire Act was enacted, i.e., to close the

"Wentling Loophole".
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10112 A. L. R. 124 reviews the cases in numerous jurisdictions to this
effect.
185 F. 2d 903 (3rd Cir., 1950), rev'd. 341 U. S. 944.
"upra, n. 5.
U H. R. Rep. 1437, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 27, 1952).

Section 4 pro-

vides that the making and enforcing of fair trade contracts (lawful as
applied to intrastate transactions) "shall (not) constitute an unlawful
burden or restraint upon, or interference with, commerce". (Parenthetical
material supplied.) Also see Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836,
842 (D. Md., 1953), which states that "(the language of subsection 4 (of
the McGuire Act) seems very clearly to indicate that . . . Congress was
expressing its public policy to the contrary of the Wentling decision. . .
u Ibid.
1Also see General Electric Co. v. Masters, Inc., 307 N. Y. 229, 120 N. E.
2d 802 (1954), where the New York Fair Trade Act was applied to sales
from a New York vendor to out-of-state consumers.

